Contact Sherin@Money Hacker


"
We listened to what our customers wanted and acted on what they said. Good things happen when you pay attention" - John F. Smith

I love receive queries and comments to assist people as much I can! You are a free bird to contact me at any time you feel. I promise to read your mail/tweet and you will receive a definite reply!

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If it is more personal, feel free to contact me at
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Thanks, be well

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About Sherin Dev - The Brain Behind The Blog

"If you have knowledge, let others light their candles with it." - Winston Churchill

sherin-dev-of-investinternals-blogMyself Sherin Dev, who owns and manages the Money Hacker personal finance blog. Welcome and nice to see you here..!!


Know about me:

I am very energetic, straightforward and positive in nature. Backwater fishing, hunting in swamps are my favorite activities. I love to spend most of my time at home with my wife and two baby girls. My favorite hobby is playing Tabla (an Indian persuasion instrument). I hate to attend parties, clubs and city life.

My strengths: My Trust in God..

I dream most to have: A Xmas night with family in the valley of Alps and a Boating/fishing in jungle surrounded Amazon river.

About Money Hacker Blog

Started in 2007, 'Money Hacker' shares lessons to create and preserve wealth and provide knowledge on many personal finance topics. , One recurring theme is my own financial experience, success and failures. Money Hacker enjoys Google PR4 status, thousands of followers and subscribers and
thousands of articles written and posted by self and by specialist content writers across the globe.

Authority I Believe to Write Here:

My view on personal finance: "Create and spend money for necessary things. Always preserve at least a 20% of the money for future"
  • Value investor from 1994
  • Have own personal investment club formally named as 'Associated Investment Partnership' or AIP
  • Zero debts
  • Strong monthly budget
  • Sufficient knowledge in critical personal finance topics
  • Able to meet any financial emergencies and anytime
Why Should I Blog - MY MISSION ?

Share Knowledge - Share authentic knowledge to people who are ignorant, but strive to succeed in Personal Finance, Investments, money management. This blog help readers to build and protect wealth, have sufficient knowledge on required personal finance topics and more over to live a disciplined life..

Charity - I adopted charity as a tool for the success of my life. Fair percentage of my blog revenue goes to trusted charity missions to provides food, cloths and education to orphan kids. I have introduced an innovative idea to engage readers to virtually contribute money to my charity endeavor by not spending a single penny from their pocket. Read more about this world's only innovative idea for charity. I am sure, you will love it.

What is Special in This Blog?


It's all about personal finance, money management, savings and investments. Blog covers all personal finance topics. Here is a short list of major topics covers in this blog.

• Personal Finance/Budgeting/Investment/Savings/Family finance
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• Live Green Ideas and Tips
• Technology and Branding

"UN-COPYRIGHT" STATUS

Money Hacker' is an 'uncopyright blog' which means, anyone can use the contents as they like. It is totally free.
I release my copyright on this contents. And if someone wants to take my work and improve upon it, I think that’s a wonderful thing. If they can take my favorite posts and make something funny or inspiring or thought-provoking, I say adding more power to them, the creative community only benefits from derivations and inspirations.

While you are under no obligation to do so, I would appreciate it if you give me credit for any work of mine that you use, and ideally, link back to the original.

Reader Best Practices:

Money Hacker has huge article data base. I always recommend you to take the "guided tour" - A Quick Start Guide To Money Hacker - A guided tour


I have all the required articles on personal finance and investment in this blog for you. Visit the archive directly and choose your own. Sorry it may take little time to load the page: Take a tour through Article titles


Guest Writer? This blog lays red carpet for you !

I never stop people from contributing to this blog. I am celebrating when I am getting guest articles. I love to hear and help the guest bloggers. If you have a unique article for me, send it to me right away! Here is a page dedicated to guest bloggers with all details: Guest Writers Room

and Finally.....

Connect to Me:

Getting a loyal friend is indeed, very difficult. When connecting to me, you are grabbing a loyal friend in need who is trustworthy and honest always. Also, through my connection, you will get befitted from all the latest articles and updates from all the best possible and reliable sources to increase your knowledge to a great extend! Visit any of my pages to have a look on how it works.

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My E-mail : investinternals@gmail.com

Committed to your success,
Sherin Dev


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Warren Buffett's "Bet on America": The Complete CNBC Interview

Date: Wednesday, 26 Dec 2007

Topics:Mergers & Acquisitions Warren Buffett
Sectors:Industrial Goods and Services
Companies:Goldman Sachs Group Inc Berkshire Hathaway Inc.

In a live interview this morning on CNBC's Squawk Box, Warren Buffett called his purchase of a big Marmon stake as a "bet on America over a long time." He also revealed that while he has been approached by financials companies about buying a stake, "we have not seen a deal that causes me to start salivating."
Here is a video clip and transcript of the complete interview:

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Words of Wisdom from Warren Buffett on the sub-prime mortgage crisis

Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies we approach the transaction as if we were buying into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. Indeed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we expect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts - not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts.

Our approach makes an active trading market useful, since it periodically presents us with mouth-watering opportunities. But by no means is it essential: a prolonged suspension of trading in the securities we hold would not bother us any more than does the lack of daily quotations on World Book or Fechheimer. Eventually, our economic fate will be determined by the economic fate of the business we own, whether our ownership is partial or total.

Ben Graham, my friend and teacher, long ago described the mental attitude toward market fluctuations that I believe to be most conducive to investment success. He said that you should imagine market quotations as coming from a remarkably accommodating fellow named Mr. Market who is your partner in a private business. Without fail, Mr. Market appears daily and names a price at which he will either buy your interest or sell you his.

Even though the business that the two of you own may have economic characteristics that are stable, Mr. Market's quotations will be anything but. For, sad to say, the poor fellow has incurable emotional problems. At times he feels euphoric and can see only the favorable factors affecting the business. When in that mood, he names a very high buy-sell price because he fears that you will snap up his interest and rob him of imminent gains. At other times he is depressed and can see nothing but trouble ahead for both the business and the world. On these occasions he will name a very low price, since he is terrified that you will unload your interest on him.

Mr. Market has another endearing characteristic: He doesn't mind being ignored. If his quotation is uninteresting to you today, he will be back with a new one tomorrow. Transactions are strictly at your option. Under these conditions, the more manic-depressive his behavior, the better for you. But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren't certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don't belong in the game. As they say in poker, "If you've been in the game 30 minutes and you don't know who the patsy is, you're the patsy."

Ben's Mr. Market allegory may seem out-of-date in today's investment world, in which most professionals and academicians talk of efficient markets, dynamic hedging and betas. Their interest in such matters is understandable, since techniques shrouded in mystery clearly have value to the purveyor of investment advice. After all, what witch doctor has ever achieved fame and fortune by simply advising "Take two aspirins"?

The value of market esoterica to the consumer of investment advice is a different story. In my opinion, investment success will not be produced by arcane formulae, computer programs or signals flashed by the price behavior of stocks and markets. Rather an investor will succeed by coupling good business judgment with an ability to insulate his thoughts and behavior from the super-contagious emotions that swirl about the marketplace. In my own efforts to stay insulated, I have found it highly useful to keep Ben's Mr. Market concept firmly in mind.

Following Ben's teachings, Charlie and I let our marketable equities tell us by their operating results - not by their daily, or even yearly, price quotations - whether our investments are successful. The market may ignore business success for a while, but eventually will confirm it. As Ben said: "In the short run, the market is a voting machine but in the long run it is a weighing machine." The speed at which a business's success is recognized, furthermore, is not that important as long as the company's intrinsic value is increasing at a satisfactory rate. In fact, delayed recognition can be an advantage: It may give us the chance to buy more of a good thing at a bargain price.

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Buffett's Advice for Young Investors

Growing rich
Some of his advice is for investors of all ages.

While discussing the importance of learning about investing, Buffett mentioned in passing that by the age of 10, he had read every book on investing in Omaha's public library.

In answering a 10-year-old girl's question about how to earn money (he recommended a paper route when she became a little older), he related having tried about 20 businesses by the time he graduated from high school (apparently the most successful one was a pinball business). Charlie Munger's advice to the little girl was that she become a very reliable person.

Lessons from Davy
In the Berkshire movie, a portrait of Warren Buffett in his early twenties emerged during a part that paid tribute to Lorimar Davidson (also known as Davy), GEICO's former CEO. The initial meeting between Buffett and Davidson was also discussed in the 1995 Berkshire Hathaway chairman’s letter.

In 1951, Buffett was studying economics at Columbia Business School under Benjamin Graham. He learned that Graham was chairman of Government Employees Insurance Co., the predecessor to GEICO. So on a cold Saturday, this 20-year-old student took the train to Washington, D.C., and headed to the headquarters, uninvited.

To his surprise, the company doors were locked, but he knocked until a custodian opened the doors. Buffett asked whether there was anyone to talk to, and was told that one man was working that weekend. Buffett introduced himself to Davidson -- then assistant to the president -- as one of Graham's students and asked whether he could ask some questions.

In the movie, Davy recalled how the conversation lasted more than four hours and how the young Buffett asked very detailed, thoughtful questions. Buffett reminisced on what a seminal half-day it was in his life.

Seeing that intelligence, work ethic, and determination at an early age, one can understand how he has become so successful over the years.

Buffett's investing advice
So how would a young Warren invest much more modest sums, say $500,000 to $1 million, was the gist of another question. Buffett said that if he was working with that amount of money, he would do things differently than he is now.

He related that when he was younger, he had more ideas than money -- now he has more money than ideas. Early in his career, Buffett was frequently thinking about which stock to sell to raise money to buy a new stock with better prospects.

He also emphasized how difficult it is to earn extraordinary returns on large amounts of capital and the technical difficulties involved in purchasing huge number of shares without tipping off everyone that Berkshire is buying.

So investors with smaller amounts to invest have some definite advantages over larger investors, assuming that these small investors have solid investment ideas and behave in a rational manner -- particularly during irrational market times

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Warren Buffett MBA Talk - Part 2





Part1

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Warren Buffett MBA Talk - Part 1



PART-2

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Rule of 72 for Compounding

The ‘Rule of 72’ is a useful means of mentally calculating the approximate annual compounding rate required for money to double over a given number of years. For example, to determine the annual compounding rate required for money to double in six years: 72 + 6 = 12 or 12%. The actual rate is 12.246%.

Conversely, if money is invested at 12% per annum compound, dividing 72 by 12 tells us it will take approximately six years for an investment to double in value. For alternate doubling multiples, the equation is: 72 + years × multiplier. For instance, a stock that has increased in price from $1 to $6 has doubled 2.5 times ($2 is once, $3 is 1.5 times, $4 is twice, $8 is three times, so $6 is 2.5 times). If the time taken to double 2.5 times happened to be, say, 12 years, the annual compounding rate is calculated as: 72 + 12 × 2.5 = 15%. This is the same as dividing 72 by the time it took for the stock to double in price: 12 years + 2.5 times = 4.8; 72 + 4.8 = 15%. The actual rate is 16.1%. Let’s say that someone suggests you should invest in gold because it’s been such a wonderful long-term investment. Leaving aside the fact that the gold price was fixed for over 100 years at US$20.65 an ounce, its price in 1932 was US$20.69. The price in the last 72 years has therefore doubled by less than 4.5 times. The annual compounding rate is therefore 72 + 72 × 4.5 = 4.5%. In real money terms, the price of gold has barely kept pace with inflation. Hence, there has been no real capital appreciation in the value of gold over the past 72 years, while its value has deflated over a longer period. The Rule of 72 is useful for doing a quick mental calculation that is not
required to be precise.

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What Value Investing Is Not

Value investing is purchasing a stock for less than its calculated value. Surprisingly, this fact alone separates value investing from most other investment philosophies.

True (long-term) growth investors such as Phil Fisher focus solely on the value of the business. They do not concern themselves with the price paid, because they only wish to buy shares in businesses that are truly extraordinary. They believe that the phenomenal growth such businesses will experience over a great many years will allow them to benefit from the wonders of compounding. If the business’ value compounds fast enough, and the stock is held long enough, even a seemingly lofty price will eventually be justified.

Some so-called value investors do consider relative prices. They make decisions based on how the market is valuing other public companies in the same industry and how the market is valuing each dollar of earnings present in all businesses. In other words, they may choose to purchase a stock simply because it appears cheap relative to its peers, or because it is trading at a lower P/E ratio than the general market, even though the P/E ratio may not appear particularly low in absolute or historical terms.

Should such an approach be called value investing? I don’t think so. It may be a perfectly valid investment philosophy, but it is a different investment philosophy.

Value investing requires the calculation of an intrinsic value that is independent of the market price. Techniques that are supported solely (or primarily) on an empirical basis are not part of value investing. The tenets set out by Graham and expanded by others (such as Warren Buffett) form the foundation of a logical edifice.

Although there may be empirical support for techniques within value investing, Graham founded a school of thought that is highly logical. Correct reasoning is stressed over verifiable hypotheses; and causal relationships are stressed over correlative relationships. Value investing may be quantitative; but, it is arithmetically quantitative.

There is a clear (and pervasive) distinction between quantitative fields of study that employ calculus and quantitative fields of study that remain purely arithmetical. Value investing treats security analysis as a purely arithmetical field of study. Graham and Buffett were both known for having stronger natural mathematical abilities than most security analysts, and yet both men stated that the use of higher math in security analysis was a mistake. True value investing requires no more than basic math skills.

Contrarian investing is sometimes thought of as a value investing sect. In practice, those who call themselves value investors and those who call themselves contrarian investors tend to buy very similar stocks.

Let’s consider the case of David Dreman, author of “The Contrarian Investor”. David Dreman is known as a contrarian investor. In his case, it is an appropriate label, because of his keen interest in behavioral finance. However, in most cases, the line separating the value investor from the contrarian investor is fuzzy at best. Dreman’s contrarian investing strategies are derived from three measures: price to earnings, price to cash flow, and price to book value. These same measures are closely associated with value investing and especially so-called Graham and Dodd investing (a form of value investing named for Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, the co-authors of “Security Analysis”).

Conclusions
Ultimately, value investing can only be defined as paying less for a stock than its calculated value, where the method used to calculate the value of the stock is truly independent of the stock market. Where the intrinsic value is calculated using an analysis of discounted future cash flows or of asset values, the resulting intrinsic value estimate is independent of the stock market. But, a strategy that is based on simply buying stocks that trade at low price-to-earnings, price-to-book, and price-to-cash flow multiples relative to other stocks is not value investing. Of course, these very strategies have proven quite effective in the past, and will likely continue to work well in the future.

The magic formula devised by Joel Greenblatt is an example of one such effective technique that will often result in portfolios that resemble those constructed by true value investors. However, Joel Greenblatt’s magic formula does not attempt to calculate the intrinsic value of the stocks purchased. So, while the magic formula may be effective, it isn’t true value investing. Joel Greenblatt is himself a value investor, because he does calculate the intrinsic value of the stocks he buys.

Simply put, you can not be a value investor unless you are willing to calculate business values. To be a value investor, you don't have to value the business precisely - but, you do have to value the business.

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Classic for you: The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett & George Soros

Harness the Mental Habits and Strategies that made Warren Buffett and George Soros the World’s Richest Investors...
...and Transform Your Own Investment Profits

The mental habits and strategies that Warren Buffett and George Soros both practice fly in the face of the conventional Wall Street "wisdom":



>> Buffett and Soros don't diversify. When they buy they always "buy as much as they can."

>> Both will tell you that making predictions about the market or economy has virtually nothing to do with their success.

>> They're not focused on the profits they expect to make. Indeed, they're not investing for the money at all.

>> They don't believe that to make big profits you must take big risks. Indeed, both are far more focused on not losing money than on making it.

>> Their beliefs about what makes markets tick are amazingly similar - and diametrically opposed to academic theories like the "Efficient Market Hypothesis" and the "Random Walk" which they both view with contempt.

>> And all those research reports that Wall Street churns out - they never read them. They don't give a hoot what other people think.

Investment success lies in your mental habits and strategies, says Mark Tier in this path-breaking book. In identifying the winning investment habits that led Warren Buffett and George Soros to phenomenal success, Mark Tier has uncovered for the first time the habits that ALL successful investors share.

What's more, every one of these winning habits is something you can easily learn yourself.

And it makes no difference whether you look for stock market bargains like Warren Buffett, trade currency futures like George Soros, invest in real estate, antiques or collectibles, use technical analysis, buy on dips or buy on breakouts, use a computerized trading system - or just want to salt money away safely for a rainy day. Adopt The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett and George Soros and you too can make more money more easily than you ever thought possible.

An Excellent Book. Worth reading ... Worth Millions ..



































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Soros & Buffett Investment Rules - 23 "Winning" Investment Habits

On the face of it, Buffett and Soros investment styles seem to have little in common. A new book suggest that both practice the same mental habits and strategies. They share similar beliefs about the nature of the markets.

In "The Winning Investment Habits of Warren Buffett and George Soros," its author outlines their 23 "winning" investment habits - tactics and strategies that he believes other investors can learn from. Many of these "habits" seem to fly in the face of conventional Wall Street wisdom: for example, Buffett and Soros do not diversify. And when they buy, they always buy as much as they can. Both will say that making predictions about the market or economy has virtually nothing to do with investment success.
Here's the list of 23 habits:

A master investor:

1. Believes the first priority is preservation of capital.

2. As a result, is risk-averse.

3. Has developed his own investment philosophy, which is an expression of his personality. As a result, no two highly successful investors have the same approach.

4. Has developed his own personal system for selecting, buying and selling investments.

5. Believes diversification is for the birds.

6. Hates to pay taxes, and arranges his affairs to legally minimize his tax bill.

7. Only invests in what he understands.

8. Refuses to make investments that do not meet his criteria. Can effortlessly say 'no'.

9. Is continually searching for new investment opportunities that meet his criteria and actively engages in his own research.

10. Has the patience to wait until he finds the right investment.

11. Acts instantly when he has made a decision.

12. Holds a winning investment until a pre-determined reason to exit arrives.

13. Follows his own system religiously.

14. Is aware of his own fallibility. Corrects mistakes the moment they arise.

15. Always treats mistakes as learning experiences.

16. As his experience increases, so do his returns.

17. Almost never talks to anyone about what he's doing. Not interested in what others think of his investment decisions.

18. Has successfully delegated most, if not all, of his responsibilities to others.

19. Lives far below his means.

20. Does what he does for stimulation and self-fulfillment - not for money.

21. Is emotionally involved with the process of investing; but can walk away from any individual investment.

22. Lives and breathes investing, 24 hours a day.

23. Puts his money where his mouth is. For example, Warren Buffet has 99 per cent of his net worth in shares of Berkshire Hathaway; George Soros, similarly, keeps most of his money in his Quantum Fund. For both, the destiny of their personal wealth is identical to that of the people who have entrusted money to their management.

Source:
Inside the strategy of Soros and Buffett
JENNIFER HILL
Appreciate your comments..........................

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How To Calculate CAGR

To know the rate of return from your investments for a period of more than one year, you need to calculate the compounded annual growth rate (CAGR). Here’s how

Step 1
Open a fresh excel sheet and type out the investment amount (PV), the future value (FV) and the duration of the investment (NPER) as shown below. For example, Rs 1 lakh invested 5 years ago is now Rs 6 lakh, what is the rate of return per year?

PV -100000

FV 600000

NPER 5

Rate -

Tip: Remember to put a minus sign when you key in the amount invested (PV) or the formula won’t work.

Step 2
Click on the empty cell in front of rate. Go to ‘fx’ function at the top of the screen. Click on it for the ‘Paste Function’ box.

Step 3
In the ‘Paste Function’ box go to ‘All’ in ‘Function category’. Then scroll down in ‘Function name’ till you find ‘Rate’, click on it and then click on OK.

Step 4
Tip: The ‘rate’ box may appear over the typed out text. You can click and drag the box away from here to anywhere on the screen.

You don’t need to type the figures in the slots, just click on the correct cell and that figure will appear in the slot.

For our example, first click in the empty slot of NPER and then click on the cell with 5 in it. Click on the empty slot in front of PV and then click on the cell with -100000. Click on the empty slot in front of FV and then click on the cell with 600000 in it.

Leave the ‘Pmt’ and ‘Type’ slots blank. Click on OK. 43% will appear in front of ‘rate’ in your excel sheet. This is the compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of return if the money grew at a steady rate each year.


Source: Outlook Money

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Homespun Wisdom from the 'Oracle of Omaha' - Part 2

Part 1

On Internet stock valuations:
"There will be enormous amounts of disappointment. The numbers of people buying these stocks to hold them are very few. I think 98% of them are being bought by people because they are going up. If these stocks stop going up, they'll get out... Very few of these companies will be big winners in the long run. It's the nature of capitalism not to get a lot of winners. You get a few."

"With Coke I can come up with a very rational figure for the cash it will generate in the future. But with the top 10 Internet companies, how much cash will they produce over the next 25 years? If you say you don't know, then you don't know what it is worth and you are speculating, not investing. All I know is that I don't know, and if I don't know, I don't invest."

On technology stocks:
"How do you beat Bobby Fischer? You play him at any game but chess. I try to stay in games where I have an edge, and I never will in technology investing."

"I do admire the management of Intel and Microsoft, but I don't have a fix on where they will be in 10 years. I think it is harder to get a fix on those kinds of businesses. I don't know how to value them. And if I started playing around without knowing how to value a company, I might as well buy lottery tickets."

On economics:
"I am not a macro guy. I don't think about it. If Alan Greenspan is whispering in one ear and Bob Rubin in the other, I don't care at all. I'm watching the businesses."

"I don't read economic forecasts. I don't read the funny papers."

On mergers:
"I am very skeptical of most big mergers. The assumptions made tend to be very optimistic. People want to do deals -- you start with that. There's a lot of Darwin going on in companies. And people who get to the top want action. I've been on 19 boards in my life, and I'd say the great majority of deals that I've seen were not very good deals."

On PaineWebber analyst Alice Schroeder's research showing that Berkshire Hathaway is selling at a sizable discount:

"I think she did a very thorough job. It seems to me she varied from the standard approach of securities analysts. But I don't comment on the value. I don't want anybody to come into Berkshire based on what I'm saying about the value of the stock. Our goal is to have the stock sell as close to the intrinsic value as possible, so that people come in and go out on the same basis.

On Coca-Cola (KO):
"I have a very strong feeling that Coca-Cola will dominate a much larger soft drink business 10 years from now than today. But in terms of the short run, I have no idea what will happen."

On daytraders and other speculators:
"We try to communicate in a way that turns people off who have a crazy approach to stocks. It matters as much who you repel as who you attract. If we were sizably owned by day traders, we'd have crazy valuations in no time -- and in both directions."

On past mistakes:
"My biggest lost opportunity was probably Freddie Mac. We owned a savings and loan, and that entitled us to buy 1% of Freddie Mac stock when it first came out. We should have bought 100 S&Ls and loaded up on Freddie Mac. What was I doing? I was sucking my thumb."

"The biggest cause of that kind of mistake [here, failing to buy more Citicorp in 1991], is that I stop buying when the stock starts moving up. I get so enamored of how cheap it was when I started buying that I stop. I have too often folded my tent. I believe in loading up on these things. There wasn't anyone who thought Citibank was going to disappear. And there wasn't anyone who thought it wasn't cheap at $9 a share."

"We've lost very little on errors of commission. The errors of omission are the big ones."

Part 1

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Homespun Wisdom from the 'Oracle of Omaha' - Part 1

Part 2

To prepare this week's cover story, senior writer Anthony Bianco got an opportunity most investors -- not to mention journalists -- would trade their eyeteeth for: a chance to spend four days at Warren Buffett's side. Bianco flew to Europe with Buffett on his much-loved private jet and then traveled with him through three countries as Buffett promoted recent Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A) acquisition, Executive Jet Aviation.

The words of wisdom that follow have been culled from Bianco's nearly 40 pages of notes taken during his own private conversations with Buffett as well as at speaking engagements and press conferences. Clear themes emerge: Buffett insists on buying businesses he understands. He doesn't like to sell his holdings. He avoids Internet and technology stocks. And he feels very lucky to be born at a time when his greatest strength -- the ability to "allocate capital" -- would be so appreciated.

Although Buffett's experience managing a company with $124 billion in assets is unique, his brand of homespun wisdom can serve all investors evaluating stocks and mutual funds for their own portfolios.

On being a good investor:
"I'm a better businessman because I am an investor and a better investor because I am a businessman. If you have the mentality of both, it aids you in each field."

"I was born at the right time and place, where the ability to allocate capital really counts. I'm adapted to this society. I won the ovarian lottery. I got the ball that said, 'capital allocator -- United States.'"

"Success in investing doesn't correlate with I.Q. once you're above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing."

On identifying good companies:
"We don't do due diligence or go out kicking tires. It doesn't matter. What matters is understanding the competitive dynamics of a business. We can't be taken by a guy with a sales pitch... What really counts is the presence of a competitive advantage. You want a business with a big castle and a moat around it, and you want that moat to widen over time. Coke and Kodak both had marvelous moats 20 or 25 years ago. Kodak's has narrowed, while Coke has been building its moat. We want an economic castle."

"The best thing that happens to us is when a great company gets into temporary trouble... We want to buy them when they're on the operating table."

On the size of his stock portfolio:
"If I was running $1 million today, or $10 million for that matter, I'd be fully invested. Anyone who says that size does not hurt investment performance is selling. The highest rates of return I've ever achieved were in the 1950s. I killed the Dow. You ought to see the numbers. But I was investing peanuts then. It's a huge structural advantage not to have a lot of money. I think I could make you 50% a year on $1 million. No, I know I could. I guarantee that."

"The universe I can't play in [i.e., small companies] has become more attractive than the universe I can play in [that of large companies]. I have to look for elephants. It may be that the elephants are not as attractive as the mosquitoes. But that is the universe I must live in."

On selling stocks:
"I don't like to sell. We buy everything with the idea that we will hold them forever... That's the kind of shareholder I want with me in Berkshire. I've never had a target price or a target holding period on a stock. And I have enormous reluctance to sell our wholly owned businesses under almost any circumstances."

"Up until a few years ago, we sold things to buy more because I ran out of money. I had more ideas than money. Now I have more money than ideas."

On holding cash:
"Today we have $15 billion in cash. Do I like getting 5% on it? No. But I like the $15 billion, and I don't want to put it in something that's not going to give it back and then some. The nature of markets is that at times they offer extraordinary values and at other times you have to have the discipline to wait."

"If you think about it [i.e., the markets], you get these huge swings in valuations. It's the ideal business arrangement, as long as you don't go crazy. The 1970s were unbelievable. The world wasn't going to end, but businesses were being given away. Human nature has not changed. People will always behave in a manic-depressive way over time. They will offer great values to you."

On the Internet's impact on business:
"The Internet as a phenomenon is just huge. That much I understand. I just don't know how to make money at it... I don't try to profit from the Internet. But I do want to understand the damage it can do to an established business. Our approach is very much profiting from lack of change rather than from change. With Wrigley chewing gum, it's the lack of change that appeals to me. I don't think it is going to be hurt by the Internet. That's the kind of business I like."

Part 2

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Interview with George Soros

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF “VALUE INVESTING”: FROM BENJAMIN GRAHAM TO WARREN BUFFETT

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What is Book Value and Intrinsic Value according to Buffett

We regularly report our per-share book value, an easily calculable number, though one of limited use. Just as regularly, we tell you that what counts is intrinsic value, a number that is impossible to pinpoint but essential to estimate.

For example, in 1964, we could state with certitude that Berkshire's per-share book value was $19.46. However, that figure considerably overstated the stock's intrinsic value since all of the company's resources were tied up in a sub-profitable textile business. Our textile assets had neither going-concern nor liquidation values equal to their carrying values. In 1964, then, anyone inquiring into the soundness of Berkshire's balance sheet might well have deserved the answer once offered up by a Hollywood mogul of dubious reputation: "Don't worry, the liabilities are solid."

Today, Berkshire's situation has reversed: Many of the businesses we control are worth far more than their carrying value. (Those we don't control, such as Coca-Cola or Gillette, are carried at current market values.) We continue to give you book value figures, however, because they serve as a rough, understated, tracking measure for Berkshire's intrinsic value.

We define intrinsic value as the discounted value of the cash that can be taken out of a business during its remaining life. Anyone calculating intrinsic value necessarily comes up with a highly subjective figure that will change both as estimates of future cash flows are revised and as interest rates move. Despite its fuzziness, however, intrinsic value is all-important and is the only logical way to evaluate the relative attractiveness of investments and businesses.

To see how historical input (book value) and future output (intrinsic value) can diverge, let's look at another form of investment, a college education. Think of the education's cost as its "book value." If it is to be accurate, the cost should include the earnings that were foregone by the student because he chose college rather than a job.

For this exercise, we will ignore the important non-economic benefits of an education and focus strictly on its economic value. First, we must estimate the earnings that the graduate will receive over his lifetime and subtract from that figure an estimate of what he would have earned had he lacked his education. That gives us an excess earnings figure, which must then be discounted, at an appropriate interest rate, back to graduation day. The dollar result equals the intrinsic economic value of the education.

Some graduates will find that the book value of their education exceeds its intrinsic value, which means that whoever paid for the education didn't get his money's worth. In other cases, the intrinsic value of an education will far exceed its book value, a result that proves capital was wisely deployed. In all cases, what is clear is that book value is meaningless as an indicator of intrinsic value.

Now let's get look at Scott Fetzer, an example from Berkshire's own experience. This account will not only illustrate how the relationship of book value and intrinsic value can change but also will provide an accounting lesson. Naturally, I've chosen here to talk about an acquisition that has turned out to be a huge winner.

The reasons for Ralph's success are not complicated. Ben Graham taught me 45 years ago that in investing it is not necessary to do extraordinary things to get extraordinary results. In later life, I have been surprised to find that this statement holds true in business management as well. What a manager must do is handle the basics well and not get diverted. That's precisely Ralph's formula. He establishes the right goals and never forgets what he set out to do. On the personal side, Ralph is a joy to work with. He's forthright about problems and is self-confident without being self-important. He is also experienced. Though I don't know Ralph's age, I do know that, like many of our managers, he is over 65. At Berkshire, we look to performance, not to the calendar. Charlie and I now keep George Foreman's picture on our desks. You can make book that our scorn for a mandatory retirement age will grow stronger every year.

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Good and Bad Companies: A Buffett View:

“I’ve got a couple of other businesses here. Company E is the ecstasy on the left. You can see earnings went up nicely: they went from $4million to $27 million. They only employed assets of $17 million, so that is a really
wonderful business. On $17 million they earned $27 million, 150% on invested capital. That is a good business. The one on the right, Company A, the agony, had $11 or $12 million tied up, and some years made a few bucks and in some years lost a few bucks.

Now, here again we might ask ourselves, ‘What differentiates these companies?’ Does anybody have any idea why Company E might have done so much better than Company A? Usually somebody says at this point, ‘Maybe Company E was better managed than Company A. ‘There’s only one problem with that conclusion, and that is Company E and Company A had the same manager me!

The Company E is our candy business, See’s Candy out in California. I don’t know how many of you come from the west, but it dominates the boxed chocolate business out there and the earnings went from $4 million to $27
million, and in the year that just ended they were about $38 million. In other words, they mail us all the money they make every year and they keep growing, and making more money and everybody’s very happy.

Company A was our textile business. That’s a business that took me 22 years to figure out it wasn’t very good. Well, in the textile business, we made over half the men’s suit linings in the United States. If you wore a men’s suit, chances were that it had a Hathaway lining. And we made them during World War II, when customers couldn’t get their linings from other people. Sears Roebuck voted us “Supplier of the Year”. They were wild about us. The thing was, they wouldn’t give us another half a cent a yard because nobody had ever gone into a men’s clothing store and asked for a pin striped suit with a Hathaway lining. You just don’t see that.

As a practical matter, if some guy’s going to offer them a lining for 79 cents a yard, it makes no difference who’s going to take them fishing, and supplied them during World War II, and was personal friends with the
Chairman of Sears. Because we charged 79½ cents a yard, it was “no dice.”

See’s Candies, on the other hand, made something that people had an emotional attachment to, and a physical attraction you might say. We’re almost to Valentine’s Day, so can you imagine going to your wife or sweetheart, handing her a box of candy and saying, “Honey, I took the low bid.”

Essentially, every year for 19 years I’ve raised the price of candy on December 26. And 19 years goes by and everyone keeps buying candy. Every ten years I tried to raise the price of linings a fraction of a cent, and they’d
throw the linings back at me. Our linings were just as good as our candies. It was much harder to run the linings factory than it was to run the candy company. The problem is, just because a business is lousy doesn’t mean it
isn’t difficult.

You really want something where, if they don’t have it in stock, you want to go across the street to get it. Nobody cares what kind of steel goes into a car. Have you ever gone into a car dealership to buy a Cadillac and
said: “I’d like a Cadillac that comes with steel that came from the South Works of US Steel.” It just doesn’t work that way, so when General Motors buys they call in all the steel companies and say, “Here’s the best price
we’ve got so far, and you’re going to have to decide if you want to beat their price, or have your plant sit idle.

A couple of fast tests about how good a business is. First question is, “How long does the management have to think before they decide to raise prices?” You’re looking at a marvelous business when you look in the mirror
and say, “Mirror, mirror on the wall, how much should I charge for Coke this fall?” And the mirror replies, “More.” That’s a great business. When you say, like we used to in the textile business, when you get down on your knees,
call in all the priests, rabbis, and everyone else, and say, “Just another half a cent a yard.” Then you get up and they say, “We won’t pay it.” It’s just night and day. I mean, if you walk into a drugstore, and you say, “I’d like a
Hershey bar” and the man says, “I don’t have any Hershey bars, but I’ve got this unmarked chocolate bar, and it’s a nickel cheaper than a Hershey bar,” you just go across the street and buy a Hershey bar. That is a good business.

The ability to raise prices the ability to differentiate yourself in a real way, and a real way means you can charge a different price that makes a great business.”

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Ron Paul on Mad Money w/ Jim Cramer 12-14-07

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Buffett: Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man - Final -Part 3

By Louis Corrigan (TMF Seymor)

(August 25, 1999) -- As Buffett has said, Berkshire Hathaway is his "canvas." What Lowenstein draws from this is that Buffett's obsessive creation of wealth is something like an ongoing artistic wager against mortality, an accumulation of fragments that Buffett can shore up -- with beautiful compounding interest -- against his inevitable physical ruin.

Indeed, aside from his relatively recent indulgence in a Berkshire corporate jet, there's little indication that Buffett cares for his money at all beyond the pleasure he has in accumulating it and the fact that it allows him to be independent enough to spend nearly all of his time making more. He lives in a modest home in Omaha in easy sight of a public street. He drives an old car. He maintains a modest office with a tiny staff.

Moreover, he has never sold any of his Berkshire stock, and as a result, he relegates very little of his personal income to charity (though he does give a percent of Berkshire profits to the charities designated by each individual shareholder). Still, it's not that he lacks a social conscience.

In 1969, Buffett applied to join Omaha's all-Jewish Highland Country Club. He wanted to use his acceptance there as a means of confronting the waspish Omaha Club, to which he already belonged, and inducing its members to admit Jews, who were then excluded. The same year, he and his business partner,
Charlie Munger, underwrote the legal appeal to a California court case that proved a landmark victory for those seeking to legalize abortion. He has also personally financed the college education of many African-American students from Omaha.

But Buffett's spirit of self-reliance runs deep. He's also addicted to tangible returns and seems uncomfortable with the fact that much charitable giving doesn't translate clearly into bottom-line results. Still, since he also doesn't believe in leaving large sums of money to children (he favors an "enormous" inheritance tax), most of Buffett's money will go to his foundation when he dies.

Lowenstein believes that this apparent stinginess really goes back to a psychological need that the "canvas" is fulfilling for Buffett. His "fear of death has contributed to his drive to accumulate," Lowenstein suggests.

The mix of his talents and his circumstances has led Buffett, it seems, to thrive on a kind of Emersonian self-reliance and intellectual independence even as he desperately clings to continuity, as if the supremely self-confident person that he is might slip away if the various tissues holding his life in place vanished. Lowenstein describes him as childlike in his obsession, a man who is happiest poring over an annual report and always likely to have one handy.

But Buffett's intense focus also makes him incapable of recreating himself, and he is threatened by anything that might force him to do so. He's someone who in a sense needs to be sheltered both from many of the practical chores of life and from unnerving emotional entanglements. His genius needs its untethered space in which to flourish, and he's spent most of his adult life around people who would insure he got it.

Perhaps the most surprising example of his need for continuity is found in his personal life. According to Lowenstein, Buffett's wife Susie had long been his chief comfort and protector, handling all of the family matters, like buying a new car, that he simply took no interest in. In 1973, however, Susie decided to move to San Francisco to pursue a long-delayed career as a nightclub singer. With her three children grown and out of the house and Warren traveling a great deal to keep track of his investments, she simply wanted her own life. Buffett was mystified and devastated.

Soon after, however, it became clear that not so much had changed after all. He and Susie would still vacation together for weeks at a time. She would still talk to him almost daily. And to compensate for her absence from home, she encouraged women from her wide circle in Omaha to look in on him. That's how Buffett got to know Astrid Menks, a Latvian woman of 31 who traveled in Omaha's bohemian circles. Within the year Astrid had moved in with Buffett. And now, the two women both remain very much a part of his life. The three of them send out cards together and sit side by side in perfect harmony at Berkshire's famed annual meetings.

Buffett's investing has embodied this same spirit. "In a sense, his whole career has been an act of holding on -- of refusing to say goodbye," Lowenstein writes. Buffett has made a number of "lifetime" commitments to the companies he's invested in. When he bought into Capital Cities as part of its bid for ABC -- now part of Disney
(NYSE: DIS) -- he signed over his proxy rights to CEO Tom Murphy as a sign of ultimate trust. Moreover, many of Buffett's greatest investments -- such as the Washington Post (NYSE: WPO), Coca-Cola, and GEICO -- have marked personal returns of one kind or another, attempts to bring some earlier part of his life full circle.

Moreover, Buffett has always worked to educate those investing with him to see things as he does, to become long-term investors in Buffett. As a result, the Berkshire Hathaway
shareowner meetings are like family reunions, with an air of community and continuity that Buffett obviously enjoys.

The point of all of this, really, is that Buffett's genius for long-term investing has something more than an intellectual rationale behind it. Yes, Ben Graham helped Buffett develop an investment framework that makes it easy for Buffett to serve as a counterpoint to an entire age, with its technical analysis, modern portfolio theory, efficient market theory, and now day trading.

But what Buffett shares with other remarkable but quite different investors -- such as George Soros -- is an understanding that an investment philosophy works best when it is deeply personal, a reflection of one's larger approach to the world. Buffett's success, then, might be partly chalked up to one great insight that any investor can follow: Know thyself, and invest accordingly.




Part 1 Part 2

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Picking Stocks In Details - General Approch

Picking stocks in details First of all an investor should make an investment plan, specifying how much he is going to invest per year, how long will he will invest and what return rate he expects. With these parameters, an investor should make an outline of his portfolio specifying industries to invest in. An investor could be a little emotional with this by excluding certain industries, but he must not be to emotional and exclude all but one (or two) industries. Also, an investor should have at least 30 different assets in his portfolio. The rationale for this is the reduction of risk. If one asset goes to zero (which is very unlikely), than an investor still have the remaining 97% of his investment. This means that in process of picking stocks an investor should first look at his portfolio and investment plan, and then to select a certain industry to invest in.

When a certain industry is selected, then an investor should select different stocks (the more of them the better) and to compare them one by one. In that process, favorites will emerge. How could we compare two different companies? There are a lot of parameters that one could take into account: EPS, P/E, PEG, P/S, P/B, Dividend Payout Ratio, Dividend Yield, Book Value, Return on Equity. The history of these parameters are also very interesting. Let's discus each one of them.

Earnings


Earnings is the after tax net income that company produces during a certain period (usually a quarter which is three months, or a year). This is a widely used indicator. Usually is compared to the prognosis of the management and independent analysts. Surpassing the prognosis significantly usually drives price up and vice-versa. To summarize, earnings should be compared to the estimates of the management and the independent analysts. Comparing earnings with earnings of some other company does not carry crucial informations. Big companies will have large earnings while small companies will have small earnings.

EPS - Earnings per Share

In order to somehow relate one company with another EPS is devised and is calculated as Net Earnings/Number of shares outstanding. Now we can see how much money each share generates. Greater EPS is better. EPS can be observed for different period of time, previous year, current year and the following year. In the first case, it is the actual data, while in other two cases it is a prognosis. The problem with EPS is in the fact that a company could generate the same amount of money with much less capital being more efficient and a better opportunity for buying. A good indicator for possible buying is the raising of EPS. An investor should be careful with earnings because that parameter could be "tuned up". As number of shares outstanding can differ from time to time, the weighted average number of shares could be used. For example if there were 1000 shares for the first nine months, and 2000 shares for the remaining three, average number of shares can be calculated as 1000x(9/12)+2000x(3/12) and that yields average number of shares 1250.

P/E - Price to Earnings Ratio

As mentioned above two companies cannot be compared neither using Earnings nor Earnings per Share. Let's say that the companies A and B have the same value 10,000$ and the same earnings 1,000$ and that company A has 10 shares and company B has 100 shares. That would give that EPS for the company A is equal 100 and for the company Bis equal to 10. We can see that although companies have the same value, EPS can differ a lot. That is the reason for introducing the Price to Earnings ratio as (Price per share)/(Earnings per share). Price to earnings ratio is usually labeled with P/E, and sometimes is called "earnings multiple" or just "multiple". The meaning of this parameter is how much do you pay for a single dollar of earning.

Let's look at the previous example. Company A has P/E = 1000/100 = 10. Company B has P/E = 100/10 = 10. That would mean that both companies have the same P/E ratio and that it takes 10$ to buy 1$ of earnings. Suppose that there will be the same earnings each year then it would take 10 years to return investment completely. Thus if we want to compare two companies having other important parameters equal we would chose the one with smaller P/E ratio i.e. the one that would return investment sooner.

Average P/E ratios for different industries can differ significantly, making comparison of two companies from different industries difficult. That is not a real problem because if we wish to maintain a portfolio, we are looking for appropriate investment in a certain industry. Average P/E ratio in the last century for the US equity is around 15. If there is unusual activity, it is possible to calculate P/E ratio that would take into account previous years.

What does it mean if a certain company has small P/E ratio (let's say 8)? It could mean several things: company is undervalued at this moment (consequently a good buy), or company is experiencing a great increase in earnings in that period. Also, it is possible that the price of stock is declining.

What does it mean if a certain company has high P/E ratio (let's say 30)? It could mean that the company is overvalued or company is experiencing a great decrease in earnings or that the price of stock is growing expecting increase in future earnings (that could be for example pharmaceutical or mining company).

PEG - Projected Earning Growth

This ratio is calculated as PEG = (Price to Earnings ratio)/(projected growth in earnings). PEG is based on projection, and therefore is a little bit subjective. Being based on P/E, PEGs for companies from different industries are different. Greater the projected growth in earnings, smaller the PEG, meaning "the smaller PEG the better".

P/S - Price to Sales

Price to sales ratio is calculated as P/S=(Share price)/(Revenue per share). Instead of P/S, abbreviation PSR is also used (Price to Sales Ratio). P/S gives us the information how much revenue generates each dollar. For example a Share price could be 100$ and Revenue per share could be 100$ yielding P/S = 1. Usually, the smaller P/S the better (one dollar of investment generates more revenue). P/S can differ for different industries. It is important to note that information about profitability of production of a certain company is not included in this ratio. A company could have small P/S but could be also unprofitable.

Book Value

Book value is the net value of a company (assets minus liabilities). Book value for itself does not mean a lot.

P/B - Price to Book

Price to Book ratio is calculated as P/B=(stocks capitalization)/(book value). Usually the lower P/B the better. This ratio is also dependent on industries. For example P/B for consulting firms is different then P/B for manufacture firms.

Dividend Payout Ratio

Dividend Payout Ratio is calculated as DPR = Dividends/(Net income). This ratio is the percentage of earnings paid to shareholders in dividends. Dividend Payout Ratio is usually used for estimation a good cash flow management.

Dividend Yield

Dividend Yield is calculated as DY = (Dividend per share)/(Share price). The greater the Dividend Yield the better. It should be noted that a profitable firm could decide not to payout dividends and to use profits for development. In that case Dividend yield is 0, but firm is still profitable.

ROE - Return on Equity

The Return on Equity is calculated as ROE = (Net income)/(Shareholder's equity). As other ratios ROE is also industry dependent but is useful to compare companies within the same industry. Usually the greater the ROE the better.

This is only a list of the most important ratios. An investor should do his homework and to check all parameters available before any investment made.

Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/?expert=Zoran_Maksimovic

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A Buffett Disciple Shares His Secrets

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Charlie Rose - An Exclusive Hour with Warren Buffett and Bill and Melinda Gates

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Mary Buffett on The Tao of Warren Buffet

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Buffett: Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man - Part 2

Part 2by Louis Corrigan (TMF Seymor)

(August 25, 1999) -- Buffett was born in 1930 in Omaha, Nebraska, in the midst of the worsening Depression. His father wanted to be a journalist but ended up as a securities salesman just when the public was losing what little faith it had in stocks. Times were tough, and though they soon got much better for the Buffett family, the Depression years made a lasting impression on young Warren.

"He emerged from those first hard years with an absolute drive to become very, very rich," Lowenstein writes. "He thought about it before he was five years old. And from that time on, he scarcely stopped thinking about it."

From an early age, Buffett was a bit quiet and bookish, someone who shied away from confrontation and seemed in need of protection. But he was also focused, determined, and energetic. He exhibited mental toughness and self-confidence. At age six, he would buy six-packs of Coke from his grandfather's grocery store for a quarter and sell each bottle for a nickel. When struck by a mysterious and dangerous illness the next year, he spent his time in bed calculating his future wealth. Later he worked at his father's brokerage house, chalking up stock prices on the blackboard. He would huddle over books like One Thousand Ways To Make $1,000.

The young Buffett cooked up endless schemes for making money, most of them quite successful. His contagious enthusiasm helped enlist the help of friends. They gathered stray golf balls that Buffett would package by brand and re-sell. Intrigued by oddsmaking, he and a friend put together a tip sheet on the horse races called Stable Boy Selections. He often declared that he would be a millionaire by age 30. He succeeded.

In 1942, Warren's father, Howard Buffett, made an unlikely run for Congress as a Republican isolationist opposed to Roosevelt's New Deal and to the war. Surprisingly, he won. The family moved to Washington, D.C., an abrupt change that so disturbed young Buffett that he ran away from home.

This momentary revolt lasted only one day, but Buffett responded in turn by devoting himself with gusto to his paper route for The Washington Post, as if he were determined to be independent. By age thirteen, the young Buffett had accumulated five routes that had him delivering 500 papers every morning before school. He was making $175 a month, the equivalent of a full-time salary for a grown man. He was saving all of it, too, except for what he paid in taxes, which he handled himself. At age 14, he bought 40 acres of Nebraska farmland with his $1,200 in personal savings and rented it out to a tenant farmer.

Buffett was ever on the make for new businesses. During his senior year of high school, he and a mechanically oriented friend started buying up used arcade games for $25 to $75 each. Buffett put up the capital; his friend did the repairs. They set them up in barber shops and split the profits with the barbers. Soon, they were raking in $50 a week. When he graduated from high school, Buffett sold the business for $1,200 to a war veteran and went off to the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce at the University of Pennsylvania.

Having read so many business books and lived the life of the entrepreneur, Buffett found Wharton disappointing. The professors spun fancy theories, but none of it was practical enough. Besides, he concluded that he knew more than they did. After two years, he skipped off to the University of Nebraska, where he supervised paper routes for the Lincoln Journal and finished off his college in three years with a schedule full of classes in business and economics. By that point, he had also accumulated, solely by his own labor, personal wealth of $9,800. He was not yet 20 years old.

Most of Lowenstein's narrative is elegantly straightforward and unobtrusive, but he occasionally pauses to consider the key question of motivation: What makes a Warren Buffett who he is? Clearly, Buffett liked numbers and had a knack for thinking in terms of business enterprise. His father's brokerage business undoubtedly helped Buffett think of investing as a likely career. But Lowenstein plausibly suggests other factors too.

For one thing, Buffett's mother suffered terrible headaches and could turn on her children out of the blue "with the wrath of God," degrading them with unrelenting hour-long tirades in which she criticized their every conceivable failing. Indeed, there was a bit of madness in her family. Buffett's family never talked about his mother's black moods, and he didn't discuss them with his friends. But they were one factor motivating him to get out of the house and do something.

Buffett's analytical nature also made him hostile to his parents' Christianity at an early age. He implicitly embraced his father's high ethical standards, but not his father's faith. But even as a boy, he would repeatedly confide in his friends his fear of death.

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The Warren Buffett You Don't Know - Final Part

We arrive late to Paris, touching down in a freakish, near-gale-force windstorm that both thrills and alarms our pilot. In four cars, we race as fast as rush-hour Paris traffic allows from Le Bourget to Dassault Aviation Group's magnificent 19th century chateau--familiarly known as Le Rond Point--on the Champs Elysees. EJA is the largest commercial customer of Dassault Aviation, Europe's leading manufacturer of business jets. Serge Dassault, the company's chairman, is hosting tonight's gala reception and dinner in Buffett's honor. By the time we arrive, the reception is in full swing. But Buffett takes a few steps into the foyer and hustles up a flight of stairs. It will be a good 35 minutes until he descends and joins the party.

Downstairs, the guest of honor's whereabouts is Topic A among Dassault's distinguished guests. It might puzzle them to learn that Buffett is on a transatlantic call to one of his employees. The matter he is discussing with Ajit Jain this evening is not urgent. But it is Buffett's custom to speak with Jain every evening. If that means keeping 200 of France's richest people waiting, then c'est la vie.

In mid-May, Buffett moderated a panel on Internet commerce at Microsoft's annual CEO summit in Seattle. As Buffett tells it, the assignment reflected William H. Gates III's sense of humor. But the Microsoft chairman and CEO, a friend of Buffett's since 1991, says it was no joke: ''Every principle that Warren holds about business and business value will still apply in this new world we're going into.'' Gates, who owns Berkshire stock in his personal account, adds that he has learned more about business from Buffett than from anyone else. ''People really underestimate what he has created in Berkshire,'' he says.

Unlike most megacorporations, Berkshire was not erected on the foundation of a single great business. Buffett began with a dying textile maker and parlayed its dwindling cash flow into ownership of a massive portfolio of enduringly profitable operating businesses. By the end of 1998, Berkshire had amassed shareholder equity worth $57 billion. This is a staggering sum, putting Berkshire well ahead of General Electric, Microsoft, and every other U.S. corporation and ranking it second in the world to Royal Dutch/Shell Group. Buffett could retire tomorrow and be confident of his place in business history not only as stock investor extraordinaire but as a corporate builder of the first rank.

LIMITS OF SCALE. Instead, of course, he is still in there pitching, to borrow one of the baseball metaphors that so delight him. From 1965 through 1998, Berkshire's book value per share rose 24.7% a year on average--trouncing the 12.9% average annual gain in the S&P 500. For some time now, Buffett has warned that the company's sheer bulk will prevent it from matching its breathtaking historical average in the future. His avowed goal is to increase its worth at an average of 15% a year. It's a modest aspiration only by comparison, for it implies adding $58 billion of shareholder equity over the next five years.

Except for the shoe group, Berkshire appears to be in fine fettle. Executive Jet is by no means its only hope for growth. GEICO, Berkshire's largest subsidiary in terms of revenue, has been wresting market share from rivals at an impressive rate and yet still has only 3.5% of the vast U.S. auto-insurance market. Like EJA, Gen Re is planning to expand in Europe and around the world. At the same time, Borsheim's, Scott Fetzer, See's Candies, and other Berkshire companies are experimenting with E-commerce. ''The No. 1 topic Warren and I talk about now is whether retail selling is going to move over to the Internet,'' says Ralph E. Schey, Scott Fetzer's chairman and chief executive.

The pursuit of accelerated growth carries added risk. In 1998, Berkshire had a banner year, posting a 48% increase in net earnings, to $2.8 billion, on revenues of $13.8 billion. But net income dropped 25%, to $541 million in the first quarter, largely because of earnings declines at GEICO and Gen Re. While both insurers were hurt by intensifying price competition, a German subsidiary of Gen Re's also took an embarrassing $275 million pretax loss on a workers' compensation pool. The down quarter did not seem to faze Buffett, who is famous for taking the long view.

If Berkshire were in fact a painting, it would look like a Jackson Pollock: an idiosyncratic product of inspired improvisation. In building his company virtually from scratch over the past quarter-century, Buffett conjured no overarching strategic vision, followed no master plan other than to buy good businesses at the right price. Even when he erred--a rare occurrence--he enfolded his purchases in an embrace intended to be permanent. ''We buy everything, even a stock, with the idea that we will hold it forever,'' he says.

It is hugely important to Buffett that his corporate handiwork outlast him. In fact, it is his hope that Berkshire--his masterpiece in progress--survive him in exactly the form it exists upon his death, like a painting framed and hung on a museum wall. But might there not come a time when his successor might be smart to sell some of Berkshire's weaker units? ''I don't think so,'' Buffett says. ''I hope whoever follows me would behave pretty much as I would if I were to live forever. I feel I owe it. I owe it to the people who sold me their businesses. They didn't have to sell to me. If I die tonight, I want them to get what they were expecting.''

MYSTERY HEIRS. Buffett says he already has picked a successor--two of them, actually: one to manage the stock portfolio, the other to oversee the operating companies. Their identities have not been disclosed to shareholders or, for that matter, to the heirs apparent themselves, because Buffett reserves the right to change his mind. He says he might eventually settle on a single successor.

Munger, who has most of his own billion-dollar net worth in Berkshire stock, professes optimism about the company's post-Buffett prospects. ''The corporate culture of Berkshire is more durable than that of the average corporation. That will go on,'' Munger says. ''The one place a death will hurt us is we're not likely to get as good an allocator of capital as Warren in the next CEO, whoever that is. But it will still be one hell of a business.''

In a company as decentralized as Berkshire Hathaway, the operating businesses need not suffer an immediate loss of momentum from Buffett's passing. On the other hand, it is not clear that a holding company with a grand total of 12 employees can be said to have a corporate culture. Without question, Berkshire's operating chiefs are united in their admiration of Buffett and his principles. But most of them barely know one another, and none is remotely Buffett's equal in terms of breadth of knowledge or personal authority. With its challengingly eccentric mix of businesses and its loose, informal structure, Berkshire Hathaway fits Buffett to a T but might well prove unwieldy for lesser mortals--especially ones constrained by loyalty to Buffett's preservationist credo.

The outlook for Buffett's personal fortune is no less problematic. His wife is his sole heir, but she is 67 years old and might not outlive him. The Buffetts have three children--Susan, 46; Howard, 44; and Peter, 41. Howard and Susan are directors of Berkshire, but none of the Buffett progeny is involved in the management of the company.

FAMILY PLAN. Buffett has said that it is his wish that 99% of the money he has made eventually go to the Buffett Foundation, to be distributed to worthy causes under the direction of Allen Greenberg, 42, the ex-husband of his daughter Susan A. Buffett. Greenberg works out of a one-person office in the same building that houses Berkshire. The foundation was set up in the mid-1960s but operates with a scanty endowment. Currently, it disburses $11 million to $12 million a year, with the bulk of the funds going to groups that provide family-planning services, including abortions. When the foundation comes into its full endowment, it is likely to rank as the world's largest philanthropy.

Buffett is often criticized--privately, to be sure--as a tightwad. But he insists that he is holding tight to his Berkshire stock not out of greed but out of a desire to ensure that control of the company passes to his heirs. ''I think I could control it with as little as 1% of the stock,'' Buffett says. ''With 35%, my wife could carry on, but not with 1%. I'd view it as a tragedy if someone whose achievement was issuing the most junk bonds or having the silliest stock price took over the company and all that we've built evaporated.''

It would indeed be a tragedy in the classical sense if the specialness of Buffett's great gifts contains the seeds of his empire's eventual undoing. For just as no one other than Buffett could have created Berkshire Hathaway, it may well come to pass that no one other than Buffett can make it work.

Thanks to ANTHONY BIANCO who had done this grate work...

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